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I. INTRODUCTION
The Last Partnerships by Charles Geisst is a historical
account of the birth, development, and eventual transformation of
Wall Street's largest investment-banking partnerships into publicly
traded corporations Geisst attributes the replacement of Wall
Street partnerships with public corporations to the American
investment banking industry's increased need for capital in the last
half of the twentieth century.2 This work builds on one of Geisst's
earlier books, Wall Street: A History, in which he provides a
chronological summary of investment banking in America
Other authors-notably Roy Smith and Lisa Endlich-have also
documented this change in the structure of the investment banking
industry.4 The works of both Roy C. Smith and Lisa Endlich reach
the same conclusion as Geisst, but offer unique perspectives.' In
Comeback-- The Restoration of American Banking Power in The
New World Economy, Smith looks ahead to the future of the
changed banking industry.6  Goldman Sachs: The Culture of
Success by Endlich is a history of the famous firm that also
provides an insider's account of Goldman's transition from a
partnership to a publicly traded corporation.7
1. See generally CHARLES GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS (2001) [hereinafter
GEissT, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS].
2. Id.
3. See generally CHARLES GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY (1997)
[hereinafter GEISST, WALL STREET].
4. See generally RoY C. SMITH, COMEBACI,: THE RESTORATION OF A.iERtIcv"
BANING POWER IN THE NEW WORLD ECONO\MY (1993), LIsA ENDLICH, GOLDMN.1
SACHS: THE CULTURE OF SUCCESS (1999).
5. See generally SirrH, supra note 4, at 112-117 (examining the changes taldng
place in the modem banldng world). ENDLICH, supra note 4 (recounting the history
of Goldman Sachs and providing a first-hand account of the firm's decision to
become a publicly traded corporation).
6. See infra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
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The Last Partnerships by Charles Geisst explores the
history of the major Wall Street partnerships and their respective
fates. The Last Partnerships first examines these financial firms'
early beginnings prior to the Civil War, and then traces their
histories through modern times.9 The book is rich with cultural
and political history associated with these partnerships and the
individuals that dominated them.' Geisst highlights the interplay
between these investment firms and the events taking place in the
world around them, recounting the occurrences that shaped the
firms, and the way in which the banks themselves influenced
historical events."
One of the major themes of The Last Partnerships is the
process by which the face of the American economy changed so as
to bring about the extinction of Wall Street leading partnerships.
The disappearance of these financial partnerships began in the late
1960s and was largely complete by 1990.13  Geisst tracks the
historical events that combined to bring about the near-extinction
of the investment banking partnerships. 4 The Last Partnerships
traces the changes in the American economy, the corporations that
made up the economy, and government regulation of the
investment banking industry. 5  Through a comprehensive
examination of the multi-faceted development of the investment
banking industry, Geisst sheds light on how small, one-room
offices became large international financial corporations. 6
8. See generally GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1.
9. Id.
10. Id. One such account focuses on the role that the Seligman family played in
the famous American writer, Horatio Alger. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS,
supra note 1, at 49. Alger was apparently impressed with the way in which the family
sought to encourage an individual's ability to work up to wealth from poverty while
he served as a tutor in the Seligman home. Id. This rags-to-riches ideal was a theme
in many of the famous writer's novels. Id.
11. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
12. See generally GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1.
13. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 282. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette was the first Wall Street firm to go public. GEISST, supra note 2 at 306.
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette announced the public sale of its shares in 1969. Id. By
1990 only Lazard Feres and Goldman Sachs were still partnerships. GEISST, THE
LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 226,282.
14. See infra notes 73-189 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 282-313 (dealing
with the humble beginnings, subsequent growth, and eventual sale of Goldman
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This book review traces the decline of Wall Street's
investment banking partnerships in the latter part of the twentieth
century, as described by Geisst in The Last Partnerships, as well as
in other related works. Part II provides an overview of these
partnerships' roles in American history. 7 Parts III and IV
describe the investment banking industry as well as the difference
between banks organized as partnerships and those that are
publicly traded corporations." Part V examines the changing
American economy after World War 11, and the way in which
economic changes affected investment partnerships.' The
beginning of the partnerships' decline and the economic situation
of the 1970s are outlined in Part VI and VII. " Government
regulations on the securities industry and their consequences for
partnerships are addressed in Parts VIII and LX.2' Part X deals
with the absorption of investment banks into large corporations.2
II. THE ROLE OF WALL STREET'S PARTNERSHIPS
IN AMERICAN HISTORY
The Last Partnerships emphasizes the way in which Wall
Street's financial partnerships helped shape American history.
The partnerships contributed financially to war efforts, funded the
arts, and produced popular icons.2" Geisst provides an interesting
contrast between these once-powerful firms and their eventual
powerlessness in the face of the economy that they once
controlledY
The influence of Wall Street's partnerships is particularly
apparent in American military history, specifically in their
assistance in financing many of America's war efforts.' The role
of investment bankers in American military history began during
Sachs).
17. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37-72 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 96-138 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 139-189 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
23. GEISST. THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 1-4.
24. Id. at 314-16.
25. Id at 315-16.
26. Id. at 3-6.
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the War of 1812.27 S. & M. Allen & Co. sold lottery tickets for the
United States Treasury to help raise funds for the war effort.28
During the Civil War, investment bankers assisted both the Union
and the Confederacy.29 The Union relied heavily on revenue
generated by bonds first issued by the treasury and then sold to the
public by investment bankers." During World War I, the Allies
capitalized on the investment bankers' ability to raise funds.3
Wall Street partnerships were successful in their efforts to
generate capital for military funding, and provided the nation with
firm financial backing in troubled times.3"
Investment partnerships also contributed to America's
cultural development.33  The Metropolitan Opera and the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, as well as many other cultural
establishments enjoyed significant contributions from successful
members of these partnerships. 4 Wall Street personalities also
received significant attention in the press and in popular culture.35
The Last Partnerships examines Wall Street's considerable
contributions to America in great detail, addressing the varied
arenas in which they changed society and shaped history. 6
27. Id. atl.
28. Id.
29. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 50. Henry Lehman helped
the South to break the Union naval blockade and also attempted a relief effort for
southern prisoners of war. Id.
30. Id. at 28. Jay Cooke assisted the Union through a number of bond issues. Id.
One such issue, made on behalf of the Treasury, generated $500 million and was the
largest issue to date. Id. at 27-28. Cooke, however, fell victim to criticism for the
commissions he collected from the bond sales. Id.
31. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 3. Jack Morgan, at the
request of the British Ambassador, helped the United Kingdom finance its war effort
and also orchestrated the Anglo-French loan of 1915. Id. at 188.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 1.
34. Id. at 1 ("The names on the buildings of many college campuses read like a
Who's Who of banking, especially those names famous before World War II.").
35. Id. at 2. Clarence Dillon was such a celebrity that one of his nicknames, "The
Wolf of Wall St.," was the title of a popular movie in the 1920's. Id. The "robber
barons" of the 1920's were also sources of attention for popular culture. Id.
36. See supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
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m. THE INVESTMENT-BANKING INDUSTRY
The Last Partnerships focuses on the Wall Street firms
commonly known as investment banks." Investment banks inform
corporations and governments about finance and strategy?3
Investment banks typically advise on methods for raising capital,
issuing stock, and pricing new issue."' Investment banks also
provide advice on mergers and acquisitions and assist vth
documentation of private and public offerings of stock9 These
firms also underwrite the issue of new stock for sale to investors'
Changes in the financial industry have led such firms to expand the
services that they offer4 2 Larger investment banks often have
trading, sales, wealth management, and compliance departments,
enabling them to perform a wide array of financial servicesi"
These firms play an important role in corporate finance and in our
economy generally. 4
IV. PARTNERSHIPS & CORPORATIONS
The Last Partnerships illustrates how investment-banking
firms, as underwriters of new stock and bond issues, assumed
increasingly larger amounts of risk as the economy expanded s
The book then goes on to explain how firms, in purchasing these
ever-growing securities issues, bore the burden of assuming more
financial responsibility for the offered security until it was sold."
37. See generally GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1.
38. STUARTR. VEALE, STocKS, BONDS, OPTIONS, FiTuREs 1-3 (2d ed. 2001).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 2. Such documentation often includes registration with the SEC as vell
as preparation of a prospectus that evaluates the company's financial health,
potential risks, and other disclosures required by the SEC. KENNETH M. MORRIS &
VIRGINIA B. MORRIS, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
MONEY & INVESTING 42 (1999).
41. MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 40, at 42.
42. VEALE, supra note 38, at 1.
43. GEIssT, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 8. Firms that offer diverse
services are called "full service." Id.
44. Id. at 6-8.
45. Id. at 6. By the late twentieth century, underwriting, block-trading deals, and
mergers could individually be larger than the U.S. Treasury's reserves in the 1890's.
Id- at 315.
46. Id. at 6.
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Commercial banks provided the cash necessary to complete
transactions such as underwriting, bat partnerships needed equity
to secure the short-term loans that were required as collateral for
such transactions.47 Geisst stresses the fact that in order for
partnerships to survive in the progressively competitive securities
underwriting business, firms needed capital both to succeed and to
48survive. During the latter part of the twentieth century,
investment-banking partnerships responded to their capital
shortages by becoming publicly traded corporations."
Corporations can raise needed capital through the issue of
corporate stock for sale to outside investors.5 In contrast,
partnerships must rely on the assets base of their partners.5 The
Last Partnerships attributes both the strengths and weaknesses of
partnerships to their limited and controlled capital.52
In her book that discusses Goldman's decision to become a
public corporation, Endlich makes clear that partnerships have
advantages and disadvantages. 3 Specifically, becoming a public
corporation greatly affects a firm's privacy as well as the investors'
risk exposure. 4  Partnerships have the advantage of privacy.5
They are not required to publish their earnings, and business
decisions are not in open view for media critique. 6 Neither the
internal workings of a partnership nor the problems it may
experience are public information.57 Unlimited risk exposure,
however, is the price a partnership pays for this privacy." Partners
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See infra notes 96-189 and accompanying text.
50. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 315-316.
51. Id. at 314.
52. Id.
53. ENDLICH, supra note 4, at 10.
54. See infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
56. ENDLICH, supra note 4, at 10. In discussions held at Goldman Sachs prior to
their decision to go public, partners discussed the issue of privacy and were pleased
that the firm's earning were not held to public scrutiny. Id. at 10; see also Rivanna
Trawlers v. Thompson Trawlers, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that general
partnerships are not typically classified as securities).
57. ENDLICH, supra note 4, at 10.
58. Id.
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stand to lose all that they have invested in a partnership because of
the partnership's inherent exposure to personal liability."'
In Goldman Sachs: The Culture of Success, Lisa Endlich's
first-hand account of her experience at Goldman-both as an
investment banking partnership and as a corporation-stresses
that incorporation dramatically alters the management structure
and business objectives of a securities firm."9 First, it does away
with the title and status associated with being a partner.1 Instead
of partners, public corporations have managing directors who do
not have a personal ownership interest in the firm; ownership
interest in corporations is in the form of stock owvnership
Further, partnerships do not have to answer to shareholders and
the value of their equity in the partnership is not subject to market
fluctuations. 63 Thus, a partnership firm is free to focus on long-
term gain without regard for quarterly earnings or shareholder
demands.' Culturally, such freedom is especially important to
investment firms with a strong focus on client needs!"5
Partnerships are free to make decisions that are in the best
interests of their clients but at odds with short-term profits;
corporations, however, must ultimately choose a balance between
shareholders and clients!' A partnership has the freedom to
manage its own affairs, while corporations sometimes do not.P'
This freedom is advantageous because it simplifies the complex
world of investment banking .2
Finally, Goldman Sachs: The Culture of Success examines
the effects that a firm's status, as either public or private, has on its
ability to recruit. Endlich especially stresses the unfortunate plight
of partnerships that went public later than others."' As a recruiting
59. Id.
60. Id. at 237.
61. Id. at 235. "The partnership gave Goldman Sachs a very real edge in
recruiting, and the motivation it provided was unmatched at public companies.
People stayed at the firm... hoping one day to receive an offer of a partnership." Id.
at 12.
62. ENDLICH, supra note 4, at 235.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 12.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 12.
67. ENDLICH, supra note 4, at 12.
68. Id.
69. 1d. at 235.
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tool, the publicly traded firms effectively lured away the non-
partner, vice-presidents from partnerships with the more
prestigious title, and typically higher salary, of a managing director
in the incorporated firm.7" Partnerships, however, found it difficult
to attract managing directors from incorporated firms that they
were not willing to enlist as a partner.7 The difficulty arose from
the fact that transferring from the position of managing director in
a corporation to vice-president in a partnership was considered a
step down.72
V. SEEDS OF CHANGE
In The Last Partnerships, Geisst stresses the need for
capital in the post-World War II American economy as a major
force in bringing about widespread incorporation of Wall Street
financial institutions.73 The postwar economic boom of the 1950s
was, at that time, unparalleled in American history.7 4 Unlike the
boom of the 1920s, the 1950s economic expansion was founded on
strong economic fundamentals that permanently expanded the
nation's economy. American consumption expanded and
American households experienced increased material success.76
This increased prosperity amongst the general public sparked
increasing investment in the stock market.77 Small, individual
shareholders grew in number, and mutual fund investments
soared.78 The number of retail investors purchasing securities
doubled between 1949 and 1959.' 9 The bull market began in 1952
with Eisenhower's presidential victory and continued for fifteen
years.8"
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 6.
74. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 273.
75. Id.
76. Id. The material success of America at that time was reflected in America's
choice in reading. Id. at 274. Vance Packard's book, The Status Seekers, became a
national bestseller. Id. at 274; VANCE PACKARD, THE STATUS SEEKERS (1961).
77. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 274.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 280.
80. Id. at 274.
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Geisst emphasizes that the change in the American
economy did not immediately harm partnerships." The economic
success that began in the 1950s greatly expanded the profits
realized on Wall Street. 2 Stock brokerages increased their sales
forces, and the number of investment bankers also increased; both
groups doubled in size between 1950 and 1960.1" The increasing
success of the stock market largely benefited companies with
progressive ideas and consequently left some older, more
traditional companies behind.' These older public corporations
with less-exciting prospects suffered from undervalued stock
prices.85 On the other hand, some popular corporations during the
late-1950s traded at forty to fifty times earnings, and it was soon
recognized that the market disparity could easily be exploited."
The potential for bargain takeovers was high in the 1950s and
corporate mergers became commonplace. 7
In Wall Street: A History, Geisst chronicles the mergers of
the late 1950s that consolidated many dissimilar corporations into
diversified corporate conglomerates. Regulators typically viewed
such mergers with distaste, but most acquisitions passed antitrust
regulations because of the diverse enterprises of the newly
consolidated entity. 9 Such corporate conglomerates were popular
81. Id. at 276-83.
82 Id at 277.
83. GEissT, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 277.
84. Id. at 283. Jones and Laughlin Steel Company was one such older entity vith
a low stock price. Id. It was acquired by the Ling-Temco-Vaught (LTV) corporation
in the late 1950's. Id. at 285. Companies whose stock price increased were involved
in the production of items such as television, air conditioning, and records. li.
85. Id. at 283.
86. Id. For example, Litton Industries began acquiring companies both inside of
the electronics and outside of it. Id. Litton was soon known as one of the first
conglomerates. Id.
87. Id at 283.
88. Id. at 283-84. International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and Ling-
Temco-Vaught (LTIV) were notable conglomerates formed during this period. Id.
IT purchased Hartford Insurance Co. as well as Sheraton Hotels. I& at 286.
89. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3. at 284. SEC Chairman Manuel Cohen
stated that conglomerates were "one of the very serious problems that is facing the
American industrial capital structure.., requiring the type of SEC remedies
employed after the analogous 1920's merger wave had developed the public utility
holding companies." Id.
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amongst investors because of the stability typically associated with
diversified corporate activities.9"
Investment bankers realized great profits from the mergers
of the 1950s and 1960s, and Wall Street: A History describes that
period as a prosperous one for securities firms. 9' Investment
banks, whose profits were determined by the size of the deal,
typically orchestrated the mergers. 9 These mergers were not
particularly capital intensive and typically only required advisory
services. 9' Because of the limited extent of the investment
bankers' role in such mergers, little strain was placed on the assets
of the participating partnerships.94 Unfortunately for partnerships,
profitable deals such as these mergers, which placed little strain on
capital resources, did not survive the bull market of the 1950s and
1960s.9'
VI. THE BEAR MARKET OF THE 1970s
Investment banks faced serious problems when the bull
market ended in the late 1960s. 96 In Wall Street: A History, Geisst
identifies four primary difficulties faced by securities firms.97 First,
a lack of investor confidence plagued securities firms.98 A number
of financial firms failed because of customer alienation, fraud, and
inefficiency; investor distrust resulted.99 Second, firms bore heavy
financial losses when many customers failed to make margin calls
as the market began to fall in the late 1960s."°  Third, new
competition in the investment business was intense, and firms
90. Id.
91. Id. at 290.
92. Id. at 284.
93. Id.
94. Id. 284.
95. See infra notes 96-138 and accompanying text.
96. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 296. These problems, however, had
roots before the actual fall in stock prices. Id. In the 1960s, a large number of firms
failed because of fraud and inefficiency. Id.
97. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
98. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 296.
99. Id. at 297. Blair and Company, Orvis Brothers, Pickard and Company, and
McDonnell and Company all failed and were forced to wind down by the New York
Stock Exchange. Id. at 296.
100. Id. at 297. The New York Stock Exchange had established a special reserve
to deal with failed margin calls, but the reserve itself was in danger of folding. Id.
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struggled as the demand for investment services failed to keep up
with new competitors entering the market."0 ' The fourth and most
serious problem that the investment banking industry faced was
the rise in market volatility.0" Market instability made the
financial investment industry an increasingly risky business.'t 3
Market volatility was further compounded by international politics
and economics that left the U.S. dollar unstable."
The Last Partnerships makes clear that the capital structure
of partnerships was a major factor in bringing about their eventual
transformation into publicly traded corporations." Capital was
the most needed asset for these partnerships, and an immense and
stable capital base became increasingly necessary."' The active
partners' private equity, which was normally the extent of the
capital available to partnerships, was becoming insufficient to meet
the business needs of investment banks.0 7 The shortage of capital
faced by partnerships was compounded by the problem of
partners' redeeming or cashing out their partnership investment
upon retirement.' This occurrence made much-needed capital
resources uncertain and unstable as partners neared retirement
age.0
9
101. 1& at 299. It was during this time in the 1970s that the term "Wall Street"
came to include financial institutions outside of lower Manhattan. Id. at 300. Many
Chicago commodities brokerage firms began to compete vth traditional Wall Street
investment firms. Id. The competition resulted from of the Chicago firms' use of
new financial instruments to hedge traditional investment products. Id.
102. Id. at 299.
103. Id. at 299.
104. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 300. During the 1970s, events in the
oil industry, combined vth U.S. foreign policy decisions, devalued the U.S. dollar.
Social unrest from the Vietnam War, coupled with inflation also hurt the U.S.
economy. Id.
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
108. GEISST, THE LAsT PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 256. The problem was put
in perspective by W. H. Donaldson, a founder of Donaldson, Luflin & Jenrette, v, ho
said that ninety percent of the capital on Wall Street was held by men over the age of
sixty. Id. at 226.
109. Id. at 256.
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VII. THE BEGINNING OF THE PARTNERSHIP'S DEMISE
In both The Last Partnerships and Wall Street: A History,
Geisst identifies the bear market as the beginning of the end for
investment firms managed as partnerships."' The bear market of
the late 1960s laid the foundation for the eventual fall of the Wall
Street partnerships."' By 1970, the investment firm Goodbody &
Co. was on the brink of failure." 2 The firm did not have the
mandatory capital requirements, and Goodbody's back room
operations were in complete disarray."3 There was little hope for
the firm's survival without outside assistance." 4 The firm had been
unable to cope with the technological automation requirements for
trading stock at that time and was unable to deal with the
increased volume of trading."5 The precarious situation of the
firm was significant because Charles Dow, the founder of the Dow
Jones Averages, founded Goodbody & Co. in the late nineteenth
century.'l 6  Due to the potential for significant loss in public
confidence if this symbolic firm were allowed to fail, great efforts
were made to secure outside assistance for Goodbody & Co." 7
The needed assistance came from the well-known, private
investment firm, Merrill Lynch."' Merrill Lynch purchased the
firm for fifteen million dollars, acquiring both Goodbody's debt, as
well as its 200,000 clients." 9
Geisst points out that the problems that necessitated the
Goodbody bailout in 1970 were indicative of the changing times
that Wall Street firms faced.' Like many other partnerships of its
time, Goodbody's backroom was in turmoil, and the firm was
110. Id. at 223-30; GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 296-327.
111. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 223-30.
112- Id. at 225. Donald Regan, chairman of Merrill Lynch in the 1970's blamed
Goodbody & Co.'s failure on its "over-ambitious effort to automate . . . it was
trapped in the midst of change: efforts to automate filed while manual procedure was
deserted in anticipation of automation's success." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 225.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 226.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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unable to keep up with the increasing trading volume.''" Most
importantly, Goodbody lacked the capital necessary to sustain its
business. ' 22 Partnerships were simply not capable of handling the
demands of the growing economy. '
The Last Partnerships explains that the Goodbody bailout,
combined with the existing market conditions, resulted in Merrill
Lynch's decision to go public in 1971, only one year after its
purchase of Goodbody."' Geisst makes clear that in spite of the
firm's status as the largest house on Wall Street, it was unable to
cope with the financial pressures exerted on its capital resources."
Donald Regan, Merrill Lynch's director remarked on the
undercaptialization of the firm:
I can recall myself the day when Merrill Lynch had
117 partners. That made for a huge and unwieldy
kind of organization... each year new agreements
were drawn up, pored over, and then signed by each
of the 117 individuals... whenever there was a need
for additional capital the managing partner would
go around to each of the partners and ask for
additional capital contributions in order to finance
Merrill Lynch's growing business."
Merrill Lynch became the first New York Stock Exchange
member that was listed on the exchange itself.'2
Additionally, Geisst notes that Merrill Lynch was highly
successful after going public' Merrill Lynch reached the top
position among Wall Street firms." ¢ Its capital resources exceeded
12L GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 226. "Backroom" refers to
the processing of securities transactions, which was done manually by clerks before
computers. Id. at 223.
122. Id. at 226.
123. Id
124. Id. at 227.
125. Id.
126. GEISsT, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 227.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 227-28.
129. Id at 228. Merrill Lynch was long known as the "thundering herd." Id. The
firm's advertising slogan: "Merrill Lynch is bullish on America," led to the common
misconception that the "thundering herd" nickname was related to bulls. Id.
Journalists, however, gave the firm this nickname not because of bulls, but rather
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$500 million, far ahead of second-place Salomon Brothers.'3 The
firm was much larger than its competitors were, with 20,000
employees in 250 offices, and more than 500,000 accounts.13'
Clearly, the firm was thriving as a publicly traded corporation
when compared to its partnership competitors.
In both The Last Partnerships and Wall Street: A History,
Geisst makes clear that finance in the 1970s changed as new
investment techniques were developed in response to the
economic conditions of the time, and competition amongst
financial services providers was intensified.1 32 As inflation rose in
1974 and 1975, consumers invested less in the stock market and
deposited more capital in savings accounts and certificates of
deposit, taking advantage of the high interest rates that these
methods of asset management offered. 3 3 Wall Street's response to
the poor economy and consequent decline in stock market
investment was money market mutual funds (MMMFs).1  These
funds invested in money markets, such as Treasury bills and
commercial bonds.' The MMMFs returned more than the
interest rate offered by banks on savings accounts and certificates
of deposit, thereby resulting in withdrawals from commercial
banks and reinvestment in the more profitable MMMFs.'3 6 The
rewards from this much-needed influx of capital to investment
banks was not enough to sustain investments with financial firms;
MMMFs generated capital for larger investment banks able to
advertise to the general public, while the smaller partnerships
continued to fail because of their inability to advertise. 3 7 In 1929,
the New York Stock Exchange had 650 partnership members;
however, by 1979, approximately 200 members remained. 38
because of the firm's long name used after 1940: Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and
Beane. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 308; GEISsT, THE LAST
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 229.
133. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 309.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 309.
138. Id. at 315.
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VIII. GovERNMENT REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY
A. Securities Investors Protection Corporation
Geisst recounts that the back room crises that were
unfolding in the wake of the bear market of the 1960s and the
subsequent failure of securities firms eventually came to the
attention of Congress. 3 9 It was clear that without some federal
action aimed at addressing these issues, investment firms might go
out of business.1" Concerns were based on the assertion that
although investments can produce higher profits than bank
deposits, the lack of protection for investments might eventually
harm the economy. 4' Although the federal government provided
deposit insurance on deposits made with commercial banks and
thrifts, no similar protection was afforded to customer assets or
stocks held by investment firms. 42 In 1971, Congress enacted the
Securities Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC), which
functioned as a rough equivalent of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) for the securities industry by protecting
"accounts at brokers" from fraud and mishandling.'43 Clearly, the
enactment of SIPC afforded some protection to partnerships and
their members, but the legislation would ultimately prove to be
insufficient to prevent the unavoidable fate of Wall Street's major
surviving partnerships."
B. SEC Rule 415
The enactment of Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
Rule 415 in 1982 and the changes it brought about in the
investment world are stressed in both Wall Street: A History and
139. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 297.
140. Id.
141. Id. "As the backroom crisis unfolded, many on Wall Street and in Congrezs
realized that if something was not done to remedy the situation the vhole prozc-s of
raising new capital and trading securities could suffer seriously. GEISsT, THE LAxST
PARTNERSHiPS, supra note 1, at 226-27.
142. Id. at 297.
143. Id. The SPIC did not protect investors from declines in market value. Id.;
SEC, SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CoRP. (SIPC), at http:/iv;.scC.fgovi
answers!sipc.htm (last visited Mar. 4,2002).
144. See infra notes 161-189 and accompanying text.
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The Last Partnerships.145 The rule made the continued existence
of partnerships more difficult. 146 Since the early 1900s, the process
by which stocks and bonds were underwritten was a gradual one.
47
Under the traditional system, a company wishing to issue new
securities registered with the SEC and then waited a mandatory,
three-week period before entering the marketplace. 4  During the
mandatory waiting period, the SEC gathered the necessary
information before the investment banks were allowed to actively
handle the deal. 1 49 Meanwhile, the lead underwriter assembled
whatever syndicate of investment banks was necessary to finance
the issue. 50 When the securities were put up for sale, the
investment bank could, by virtue of having already assembled its
investors, open and close the deal immediately; essentially the
issue had been purchased before it was for sale.' This process
was amenable to the investment banks because they were not
required to commit any money to a deal until it closed.'52
Investment banks enjoyed a role in which they assembled investors
and then passed the money to the issuer, less their commission. 153
The Last Partnerships emphasizes SEC Rule 415 and the
substantial changes it brought about.'" The rule altered the role
of the investment banker as an underwriter as well as the process
by which securities were issued for sale.'55 Known as the "shelf
registration rule," Rule 415 allowed issuing companies to
preregister with the SEC and then wait for favorable market
145. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 332; GEISST, THE LAST
PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 206.
146. GEISsT, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 206-08. Rule 415 was
enacted on a trial basis and then was instituted permanently in 1983. SEC, supra note
143..
147. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 205.
148. Id. "The new 'shelf registration' provisions embodied in Rule 415, proved to
be more controversial than the SEC had anticipated.... The SEC adopted Rule 415
on a permanent basis, but limited its use to 'traditional' types of delayed offerings
and to primary offerings." DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 134 (5th ed. 1991).
149. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 205.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See infra notes 156-165 and accompanying text.
155. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 206-07.
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conditions for a period of up to two years before actually making
the securities available for sale. " ' The three-week period during
which investment banks arranged the financing for the issue was
abolished."7 The net effect on investment banks was that they no
longer could arrange financing before purchasing the stock." 3
Underwriters were now obligated to purchase new issue before
arranging a group of investors willing to buy it. 9  Rule 415
required firms wishing to underwrite new stock and bond issuances
to have vast amounts of readily available capital, thus placing
additional strain on the investment firms' limited capital
resources.
160
a. RESPONSE To GONVERNMENT REGULATION
Rule 415 heavily impacted Morgan Stanley.'"6 This old-line
firm had long dominated the underwriting business and had helped
originate the modem syndicate." 2 The effects of Rule 415
dethroned Morgan Stanley from its position atop securities
underwriters, as clients began turning to investment firms that had
greater access to capital resources.' Largely in reaction to the
enactment of Rule 415, Morgan Stanley went public in 1986,
selling twenty percent of its partnership equity." The partnership
156. Id. at 206. Money could be raised faster on the Euro market, v,here
registration rules were more relaxed. GEIsST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 331-32.
"Wall Street need to change its procedures to vn back business from the Eurobond
market ... The result was Rule 415." Id.
157. GEISST, %VALL STREET, supra note 3, at 332.
158. GEIssT, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 206.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id. Follow;ing enactment of the rule, Morgan Stanley fell out of first place in
corporate underw iting for the first time in years. Id.
162. GEISST, WALL STREET, supra note 3, at 332.
163. Id. "Many Wall Street executives noted that a trend vwas beginning to take
even more business away from old-line house. A window of opportunity was open for
new, aggressive firms that banked on their expertise rather than tradition." Id. This
change took investors from old-line firms like Morgan Stanley. Id. Long-standing
Morgan Stanley client, General Motors, began using other investment banks to
undenvrite its issue. Id. Solomon Brothers and Merrill Lynch, both no longer
partnerships, took the first and second positions as leading underwriters. GEISST,
THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 206; see infra note 16b and accompanying
text.
164. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS. supra note 1, at 207. The offer yielded
$292 million. Id. The four leading partners held stock worth approximately $55
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crumbled because the firm was unable to meet the capital needs of
its underwriting business under the new requirements of SEC Rule
415.165
Chronicling the incorporation of another securities firm,
Geisst explains that Salomon Brothers, like other investment
banks in the early and mid-eighties, eventually responded to the
increasing demand for capital by selling to Phibro Corporation, a
commodities trading firm." Despite the fact that Salomon had
underwritten IBM's 1979 billion-dollar bond issue, the firm
recognized that as a partnership, it could not continue to meet the
capital demands of the evolving market. 67  In describing
Salomon's decision to be bought by Phibro Corporation, William
Voute, one of the firm's managing directors, remarked that
Salomon: "saw the size of the market expanding and the U.S.
Treasury needs expanding. We had only in the neighborhood of
$300 million in capital, and it was felt that this wasn't enough to
bring us into the next century."'168 Retirement of Salomon partners
also made it difficult to maintain the predictable and permanent
capital base necessary for modem investment banking needs. 69
Phibro's purchase of Salomon ended the firm's seventy-one year
partnership history. 7 Salomon's decision to end its existence as a
million. Id. Morgan Stanley remained an independent public corporation until 1997,
when it merged with Dean Witter. Id. The merger created a large, full-service
investment firm. Id.
165. See generally id. at 206-07.
166. Id. at 256.
The merger between the two firms was actually a buyout of
Salomon by Phibro. Phibro paid $550 million for Salomon,
allowing the partners to take their cash out of the firm. The new
holding company became Phibro-Salomon, and the two operating
divisions retained their own original names. It was now a publicly
traded company.
Id. at 256. The new entity had capital of more than $1.7 billion. Id.
167. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 252,256.
168. Id. at 256 (citing ROBERT SOBEL, SALOMON BROTHERS 1910-1985 9 (1986)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 256. Phibro control of Salomon ended shortly after Phibro purchased
the firm. Id. The dominance ended when the Phibro commodities business
collapsed. Id. John Gutfriend, a Salomon partner, orchestrated a reverse buy-out of
Phibro. Id. at 257. Salomon then emerged with $65 billion in assets. Id. Gutfriend's
tenure as CEO of Salomon was the subject of a best-selling book, Liar's Poker, by
Michael Lewis. Id. The book, written by a former trader at the firm, is an insider's
account of life at Salomon. Id. It describes wild speculation and personal wagers
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partnership on the heels of such success as the IBM bond issue is a
testament to investment bankers' increasing reliance on extensive
capital resources.
Due to the numerous changes in the securities industry that
Geisst describes, the vast majority of Wall Street's major
partnerships had disappeared by 1990."l Two investment banks,
Lazard Feres and Goldman Sachs, managed to maintain their
status as partnerships. 112 These two traditional firms fought to
preserve their cultures by remaining intact as partnerships.'73 In
1999, however, Goldman Sachs became a public company."r
Lazard Feres still remains a partnership, but was forced to
consolidate its three separately operating divisions into a single
operation in 2000 in an effort to cut costs.
75
The Last Partnerships notes that Goldman Sachs was able
to maintain its status as a partnership for so long because of the
firm's enormous profitability. 76 Nonetheless, the firm's decision
to withstand the pressure to go public brought about changes in
both the firm's identity and its policies.'" In 1989, the capital-
intensive investment banking business accounted for thirty-five
percent of the firm's profits; by 1993, this percentage had slipped
to sixteen percent.1 7' The decline in Goldman's underwriting was
offset by its trading successes. 7 But, the firm's need for capital
was apparent to the firm's management."' The partnership
agreement was rewritten every two years to keep up with market
among the firm's top members that reached stakes of one million dollars. Id.;
MIXCHAEL LEWIS, LIARS POKER (19S9).
171. GEIssT, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 232
172. Id.
173. See generally id.
174. See infha note 188-189 and accompanying text.
175. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 313. "Lazard Freres
consolidated its assets as a single, global firm, recognizing that having three separate
operating units even under one chief executive was not feasible in the era of the giant
international financial services company." Id.
176. Id. at 307. Goldman's profit in 1986 was $750 million. Id.
177. ENDLICH, supra note 4, at 6. Goldman needed more capital to remain
competitive. Id.; see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
178. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 309-09.
179. Id. at 309.
1SO. Id.
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conditions; these agreements contained numerous provisions
aimed at maintaining the firm's control over partnership assets. 8'
Geisst identifies 1994 as the year in which Goldman's fate
was made clear. 8 2 In that year, the firm sustained heavy trading
losses.8 3 Although Goldman had the best reputation on Wall
Street, the firm was in jeopardy of falling behind the increasingly
global economy if it did not respond to its growing need for
capital."8 In 1996, John Corzine proposed the idea of a public
offering to the partners; the proposal was rejected." 5 The firm
managed to sustain its need for capital with tightened control on
the partners' ability to withdraw capital from the partnership. 8
6
Although the firm realized enormous profits in 1998, commercial
banks targeted Goldman as a potential takeover candidate.'87
That same year, Goldman Sachs filed a registration statement for
the issue of public stock in the firm.' Initially, the sale of the
partnership was postponed because of unfavorable market
conditions, but in May of 1999, the firm ended its existence as a
partnership with an initial public offering on the New York Stock
Exchange.'89
X. FURTHER CHANGES IN THE INVESTMENT
BANKING INDUSTRY
In Comeback: The Restoration of American Banking
Power in The New World Economy, Roy Smith describes changes,
beyond simple incorporation that took place in the securities
181. See generally id.
182. Id. at 310.
183. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 310. By the end of that
year, thirty percent of Goldman's partners had left the partnership, taking their
capital with them. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id at 310. The firm policy required partners to place their partnership assets
into a capital fund upon retirement. Id. The amount deposited was paid to the
retiree over a three-year period. Id.
187. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 1, at 311. Goldman's profit for
1998 was over one billion dollars. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 311-12. Goldman sold shares at fifty-three dollars. Id. at 312. It was
the second largest IPO ever. Id. The sale of its stock was oversubscribed ten times.
Id.
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industry.' 90 During the 1980s, some publicly traded investment
firms became owned and controlled by other large corporations.'
Parent corporations were both financial and commercial." For
example Dean Witter, a brokerage firm, came under the control of
Sears Roebuck and Co. in 1981.' Donaldson Lufkin and Jenrette
became part of Equitable Life Co. in 19852"4 These diversified
conglomerates were viewed as powerful, with diverse offerings of
goods and services, as well as highly sophisticated marketing
infrastructures. 19' The expectations for the investment banking
side of these large conglomerates were high."% The anticipated
success was based on a belief that the established infrastructure of
the parent corporation would be adopted by the investment bank
subsidiary and that the result would be increased efficiency.""
However, the expectations for and the reality of these subsidiaries
were not compatible.9
Smith identifies the primary reason for the investment
banks' inability to excel by virtue of their connection with a parent
corporation as the incompatible nature of the two entities.'
Investment banks, unlike ordinary businesses, rely on their
freedom to respond to market fluctuations. :"" A focus on
adaptation for short-term gain is a necessary part of any successful
investment bank.'O Successful employees are rewarded early in
their careers with bonuses that are very different from ordinary
businesses. 2 Further, the cultures of the two entities are entirely
at odds. While a typical enterprise is likely to benefit from control
and discipline, investment banks succeed from an absence
190. See generally SmiTH, supra note 4, at 111-14.
191. Id.
192 Id.
193. Id. at 111.
194. Id. Shearson Lehman was absorbed by American Express (two-step process)
in 1979 and 1984. Id Kidder Peabody became part of General Electric Co. in 19 S.
Id.
195. S%=rH, supra note 4, at 112.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See generally id.
200. Id.
20L See generally SMIT-, supra note 4, at 112.
202. Id. "Success is rewarded early and often by bonuses unthinkable in industrial
companies." SINH, supra note 4, at 112.
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thereof.0 3 Therefore, the expected benefits stemming from the
parent corporation's controlling policies and business practices
were fundamentally incompatible with their investment bank
subsidiaries.2"
Smith explains that the parent corporations were aware of
the disparity between their own business practices and those of
their investment banking subsidiaries, and they consequently made
efforts not to disturb the subservient corporation's practices. 5
However, this policy was not stringently followed.0 6 Once the
investment banks began losing money, parent corporations took
measures to control the risks and improve the organizational
systems of the financial subsidiaries.' 7 The eventual consequence
of these parental controls was that many financial affiliates had to
call on the controlling corporations for assistance in 1990.211
XI. CONCLUSION
The incorporation of Wall Street's partnerships is not
unlike many of the changes that are now dominating the world in
which we live. As the world grows smaller, the smaller businesses
are disappearing. Geisst emphasizes that the consolidation of
industry and mercantilism, coupled with America's birth as a
superpower, has brought in a new era of competition.2" This new
competition places demands on businesses within the marketplace
that cannot be met without a large capital base."0  The
disappearing partnerships are like so many other American
businesses, which have been forced to incorporate in order to raise
the money necessary to compete.2 1 1 However, as Endlich notes,
incorporation has led to mixed results for investment banking
203. See generally SMITH, supra note 4, at 112.
204. Id.
205. Id. "Acquirers... plan to leave the investment bank alone, to run its own
affairs in its own screwed-up way." SMITH, supra note 4, at 112.
206. Id.
207. SMITH, supra note 4, at 113. "They were playing with Mother's money, and
were quite willing to risk it." Id. at 112.
208. Id. at 114.
209. See supra notes 45-187 and accompanying text.
210. SMITH, supra note 4.
211. Id.
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clients.212 Expanded capital bases created by public onership and
secondary offerings has enabled investment bankers to meet the
growing demands of the modem economy.213' Public ownership,
however, must force investment bankers to balance the interest of
clients against those of shareholders.2"4 Thus, as Smith notes, the
increased abilities of incorporated investment banks come at
price.2
15
Expounding on the propositions set forth in Geisst's work,
Smith carefully notes that uncontrolled growth can yield
diminishing returns. 216 The checkered record of firms that were
absorbed into other non-financial institutions indicates that
capital, in and of itself, does not necessarily correlate with
success. 217  Accordingly, Wall Street's financial institutions are
likely to resist mergers with more wealthy corporations.
The Last Partnerships examines Wall Street's partnerships
and the major role that they played in the development of
America. These partnerships helped to finance wars and to create
the modem economy. Ironically, it was the very nature of the
partnerships' businesses that destroyed them. Government
controls, coupled with the capital demands of the modem
economy, destroyed the partnerships.
W. WINBORNE BOYLES
212. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
213. SINTH, supra note 4.
214. Id.
215. 1d
216. See supra notes 191-208 and accompanying text.
217. SmTH, supra note 4.
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